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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
case, had the court treated the wife as the husband's procedural
representative, rather than recognizing that she had, in her own
right, a right of action for community claims.
Billy J. Tauzin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION - DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, a member of the New York bar, refused to pro-
duce certain financial records or to testify in a proceeding
against him for professional misconduct, on the grounds that
the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered
petitioner disbarred, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court held that since Malloy v. Hogan1 pro-
scribes the imposition of any penalty for the assertion of the
privilege and since the threat of disbarment was a powerful form
of compulsion which made the assertion costly, an attorney's in-
vocation of the privilege against self-incrimination could not
serve as a basis for his disbarment, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511 (1967).
The Court explicitly overruled Cohen v. Hurley,2 decided by
a 5-4 majority six years ago. In that case, the Court held that
the lawyer was under a duty to the Court and the public to co-
operate in investigations concerning his qualifications as an
attorney. Though he had the right to assert the privilege, as
long as disbarment was not based on this assertion but on breach
of his duty to cooperate with the investigating committee, it was
a proper disciplinary measure. The state's interest in maintain-
ing the standards of the legal profession was considered greater
than the individual lawyer's unfettered right to exercise the fifth
amendment privilege. Therefore a "dual status" was imposed
upon the attorney, whereby his right to claim the privilege as
any other citizen was subordinate to his special duty to the state
to answer questions concerning his qualifications to continue the
practice of law."
1. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2. 366 U.S. 117 (1061).
3. See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1061); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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In rejecting the "dual status" theory4 of Cohen as applied to
disbarment proceedings, the Court casts doubt on the validity of
a refusal to admit an applicant to the bar on similar grounds.
In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,5 petitioner was denied
admittance to the bar for refusing to answer questions concern-
ing communist affiliations. Since the question had substantial
relevance to his qualifications, the denial was not considered ar-
bitrary. Although petitioner in Konigsberg did not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, but instead rested his objec-
tion to the questions on first amendment grounds of freedom
of association, the fact remains that the Court allowed a state
to deny admission to the bar for refusal to answer questions
having substantial relevance to the applicant's qualifications.
This reasoning seemingly would apply to assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege as well as that of the first amendment.
However, following the rationale of the instant case, it seems
logical that an applicant could not now be refused admission to
the bar for claiming his fifth amendment privilege since this
would indeed make assertion of the privilege costly.
The result in the instant case was not compelled by applying
the federal standard of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination to the states. 6 In Orloff v. Willoughby,7 a doctor
was denied a commission in the army for refusing to answer
questions concerning his communist affiliation on the grounds
that such answers would tend to incriminate him. The court
upheld this action, reasoning that by refusing to answer, the
petitioner prevented the commissioning authority from determin-
ing facts bearing on his qualifications to serve as an officer.
Similarly, in Kimm v. Rosenberg,s the Court refused to suspend
a deportation order since, by refusing to answer, petitioner failed
to discharge the statutory burden of proving that he was not a
communist. Both these cases involve application of the so-called
federal standard and make assertion of the privilege costly.
Since, under the federal standard, assertion of the fifth amend-
ment privilege has been xpade "costly" in the past, the Court
had solid ground to affirm the disbarment of petitioner in the
instant case had it chosen to do so.
4. For a discussion and criticism of this dual status theory, as applied to at-
torneys, see Comment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 644 (1962).
5. 366 U.S. 37 (1961).
6. The federal standard governing assertion of the privilege against self-in-
crimination was held to apply to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 366 U.S. 117
(1961).
7. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
8. 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
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However, the court relied on language in Malloy v. Hogan9
and Griffin v. California' and proscribed any sanction which
makes assertion of the privilege "costly." But any sanction tend-
ing to discourage assertion of the privilege would make such
assertion costly, so this ruling could conceivably be interpreted
to bestow on the assertion of the privilege a sanctity which would
hinder the proper function of the state or federal government
in the maintenance of qualified public servants. 1 Thus, it would
be best to limit the rationale of the instant case to proceedings
involving attorneys, and leave an employee's duty to the state
unaffected. 12
However, can an attorney be distinguished from an employee
of the state with regard to his right to claim the privilege against
self-incrimination? It is submitted that this distinction may
very well be made.' 3  Two factors indicate that the attorney's
duty should not be as great as that of the state employee. In the
first place, their source of compensation is different. Though
an officer of the court, an attorney receives his remuneration
from his client. He is not an employee of the state but is merely
a licensee; clearly the duty owed by the licensee to his licensor
is not as great as that owed by an employee to an employer who
pays his wages. 1 4  Secondly, dismissal of a state employee is,
for the most part, a matter of administrative discretion, whereas
an attorney can be disbarred only after a formal judicial hearing
with attendant due process safeguards. 15
9. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
10. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
11. See Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) ; Beilan v. Board of
Public Education, 375 U.S. 399 (1958) ; (dual status applied to school teachers
in both cases) ; Lerner v, Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (applied to subway con-
ductor), See also Comment, 47 CORNEriL L.Q. 255 (1961).
12. Justice Douglas states that the Court does not pass on whether a police-
man who invokes the privilege could be discharged (385 U.S. at 516 n.3), but,
as indicated, a strict reading of the language used by the court seems to require
such a conclusion. However, if the Court does limit the holding of this case to
attorneys, it is submitted that it has valid grounds to do so. See notes 13-19 infra
and accompanying text.
13. Justice Fortas, concurring, draws this distinction. Because of this it would
seem that the majority would change were the Court presented with a case in-
volving a state employee's assertion of the privilege.
14. This is the position taken by Justice Fortas, 385 U.S. at 520: "But a lawyer
is not an employee of the State. He does not have the responsibility of an em-
ployee to account to the State for his actions because he does not perform them
as agent of the State. His responsibility to the State is to obey its laws and the
rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as a part of its licensing procedures.
The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and officer
of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth
Amendment rights."
15. In Louisiana, an attorney can be disbarred only after a committee appointed
by the Supreme Court has borne the burden of proving the charges against him.
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In a criminal proceeding, no inference may be drawn from a
defendant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.16 Disbarment proceedings, although quasi-criminal in
nature, have traditionally been considered civil, rather than
criminal. 17 In a civil proceeding, no inference will be drawn
from a party's assertion of the privilege where that party did
not have the burden of proof until the party bearing the burden
of proof had established a prima facie case.' Since there is a
traditional reluctance to disbar attorneys1 9 and since the ac-
cuser must bear the burden of proving the misconduct charged,
it follows that an attorney's invocation of the privilege alone
could not discharge the accuser's burden and therefore could not
serve as a basis for disbarment.2 0  For these reasons, and be-
cause it appears anomalous to make the exercise of a constitu-
tional right misconduct justifying disbarment, it is submitted
that the rule in the instant case as it applies to disbarment pro-
ceedings is welcome. 21
As indicated above, however, the ruling of the instant case
would seem to affect proceedings for admission to the bar also.
This result is not as desirable, for the applicant, when questioned
concerning his qualifications for admission, does not face a "loss
of professional standing, professional reputation, and of liveli-
hood ' 22 but instead is faced with denial of one particular means
In re Fallon, 204 La. 955, 16 So. 2d 532 (1944). See also In re Steiner, 199
La. 500, 6 So. 2d 641 (1942) ; Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Wheeler, 243 La. 618,
145 So. 2d 774 (1962). In addition, the evidence introduced must be "lawful,"
In re Reed, 203 La. 1008, 14 So. 2d 641 (1943), and evidence of both the act and
the accused attorney's motive for its commission must be clear and convincing.
In re Weber, 202 La. 1037, 13 So. 2d 341 (1943). See also 7 C.J.S. Attorney and
Client § 33, at 787 (1937).
16. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), Wilson v. U.S., 149 U.S. 60
(1892). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 132, at 276-277 (1954).
17. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 28, at 771 (1937).
18. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 644, 648 (1962), and authorities cited
there.
19. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
20. In -fact, the Supreme Court in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of
New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
353 U.S. 252 (1957) indicated that a good faith claim of a constitutional privilege
(be it federal or state) could not raise an inference of bad moral character or
professional misconduct. See also Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956). This conclusion has also been reached by several state supreme
courts. See e.g., Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955) ; In re Holland, 377
Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
21. Admittedly, this holding would cast doubt on the constitutional validity of
state statutes should there be any requiring the accused attorney in a disbarment
proceeding to bear the burden of proving his fitness, but this would appear to be
a just result for an attorney should be deprived of his profession only on strong
evidence of professional misconduct and not on an inability to prove that no
misconduct had taken place.
22. 385 U.S. at 516.
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of livelihood. Although this undoubtedly is a sanction making
assertion of the privilege costly, since the applicant must bear
the burden of proving his fitness and by refusing to answer
questions regarding .that fitness he could thwart any inquiry
into his qualifications, it seems that the rule of the instant case
is unsatisfactory if applied to admission proceedings. Instead,
it is submitted that the court adhere to the evidentiary weight
test whereby all the evidence, including the assertion of the
privilege, is considered in deciding whether the applicant has
discharged his duty to prove his suitability to practice law.28
Finally, although the rule of the instant case may be desir-
able for removing the fetters from a lawyer's exercise of the
privilege, it does present difficulty for the state investigating
charges against an attorney where only the attorney or his
records could provide the needed information. This difficulty
can perhaps be overcome by requiring the attorney to keep
certain records which bear on his practice of law. These records
would then become "required" and under Shapiro v. United
States,24 would be outside the protection afforded by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 25  It is doubt-
ful that granting the attorney (or applicant) immunity26 from
criminal prosecution if he gives the required testimony, so pro-
tecting him from both state and federal prosecution based on the
testimony given, 27 would accomplish the desired result. An im-
munity statute must be as broad as the privilege it replaces and
so must remove those sanctions whose imposition was protected
by the privilege. 28  Traditionally, the witness compelled to relin-
23. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232
(1957) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), where
the Court found that there was insufficient evidence to overcome applicant's
proof of fitness, so making denial of admission unreasonable. But see Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), where suspension of petitioner's medical
license was held to be in accord with the evidence.
24. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
25. The plurality does not reach the question of the required records doctrine
in this case since it was not properly presented, nor do the Justices indicate what
their opinion on this doctrine would have been had the issue been presented. How-
ever, Justice Fortas, in his concurring opinion, states that he would have affirmed
disbarment had Spevack failed to produce required records, but agrees that the
issue was not properly presented. For a critique of the scope of the required
records doctrine, see Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (1965).
26. In the instant case such immunity could have been extended to the peti-
tioner under NEW YoRK PENAL LAW § 2447, but it appears that the investigating
committee chose not to do so. But see note 28 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
28. See United States v. Ulmann, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896). For a good discussion of the interplay between immunity
statutes and the privilege against self-incrimination, see Sobel, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized," 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1964).
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quish the privilege was protected from the imposition of penal
sanctions whereas remedial sanctions could follow from the
compelled testimony.29 Since disbarment was not imposed to
penalize the attorney but to protect the public from official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice law,80 and so could
be termed a remedial sanction, the attorney might be required
to testify provided no penal sanction would result from the
testimony. But the instant case makes it unlikely that disbar-
ment will be considered a remedial sanction in the future. 1 The
"required records" doctrine, however, may furnish a means
whereby the state can maintain the high standards of the legal
profession while preserving to the lawyer his constitutional right
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thomas R. Blum
29. See Comment, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1454, 1464 (1957). Remedial sanctions
are those imposed to protect a continuing and substai~tial public interest. Penal
sanctions are imposed to punish an individual for past conduct. So in Hale V.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) public disgrace was not considered to be a penal sanc-
tion nor was loss of job so considered in Pfitzinger v. United States Civil Serv-
Com'mn, 96 F. Supp. 1 (D. N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1951),
nor were treble damages so considered in Amato v. Parker, 157 F.2d 719 (10th
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947).
But 8ee Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1586 (1963), where it is urged that the
scope of penal sanctions be broadened to include all sanctions which may work
a severe deprivation on the person compelled to testify. So if a sanction is imposed
for a deliberate or negligent disregard of establish standards, that writer urges
that the sanction be deemed penal. But if the sanction is levied for failure to meet
those standards because of incompetence or inability he suggests that it be then
deemed remedial. Clearly, application of such a standard would prevent disbar-
ment which rests on testimony compelled by conferring immunity.
30. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) ; Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52
(8th Cir. 1927) ; In re Cohen, 9 A.D.2d 436, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1959).
31. Justice White, in his dissent, 385 U.S. at 530, points out that Garrity v.
State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) would prohibit the use of testimony
procured under threat of disbarment in a subsequent criminal proceeding and
so votes to affirm petitioner's disbarment in the instant case. Justice Harlan
also seems to espouse this view in his dissent. 385 U.S. at 520. So it would
seem that four Justices of the Supreme Court (since Justices Stewart and Clark
joined in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion) are of the opinion that disbarment
would be a remedial, not a penal, sanction and so could be imposed without consti-
tutional repercussions.
The plurality, on the other hand, ignores this question completely, concen-
trating on protecting the attorney's assertion of the privilege from any sanction
which makes such assertion costly. The whole tenor of its argument, however,
is that disbarment is such a sanction to be protected by the privilege. And,
logically, since it is protected by the privilege, it must be so protected by an im-
munity statute.
